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BEFORE THE AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION 
WORTHINGTON & KIMBALL 
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, a 
Utah general partnership, 
Claimant, 
v. 
C & A DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, 
an Arizona corporation, 
C & A ENTERPRISES, an 
Arizona partnership, and 
C & A COMPANIES, INC., an 
Arizona corporation, 
Respondents. 
This matter came before Peter W. Billings, George E. 
Lyman and B. Lue Bettilyon, sitting as a board of arbitrators, 
to resolve disputes between the parties arising out of the per-
formance and interpretation of a contract originally between C & A 
Development Company, as owner, and Worthington & Kimball Construction 
Company, a Utah general partnership and L. M. Hendriksen, dba 
Western States Construction, a sole proprietorship, as contractor, 
for the design and construction of a factory building to be occupied 
by Permaloy Corporation. 
Seventeen days of hearings were held on April 25 to 29, 
May 16 to 20, June 20 to 24 and July 14 and 15, 19 83 and the 
construction site was visited by the panel and representatives of 
the parties on July 14, 1983. In addition, the arbitrators met on 
July 5, 1983 to review the evidence and to prepare suggestions to 
the parties as to the matters they believed should be covered by 
the post-hearing briefs. During the hearings both parties were 
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given full opportunity to call all witnesses they desired and 84 
exhibits were introduced by Worthington & Kimball and 59 by the 
respondents. Both parties were given opportunity to file and did 
file post-hearing and reply briefs. 
Under date of August 30, 1983 Worthington & Kimball 
moved to reopen the hearing to determine the respective rights and 
liabilities of C & A Development Company, C & A Enterprises and 
C & A Companies, Inc. under any award made in these proceedings in 
light of an assignment of the original contract by C & A Development 
to C & A Enterprises in March, 1981. Under date of September 29, 
1983 the American Arbitration Association notified the parties that 
the arbitrators had agreed to reopen the hearings. Under date of 
October 18, 1983 the parties were advised the reopened hearing 
would be held on October 24, 1983, limited to evidence and argument 
as to whether any award can or should be made for or against any 
party other than the parties to the original contract, i.e., C & A 
Development Company as owner and Worthington & Kimball Construction 
Company as contractor, and as to the allocation of costs and fees. 
Because of the inability of counsel for respondents to 
appear, the hearing scheduled for October 24, 19 83 was not held. 
By means of a conference telephone call, the parties stipulated 
that in March, 1981 the contract between Worthington & Kimball and 
C & A Development Company was assigned by C & A Development to 
C & A Enterprises, an Arizona partnership of which C & A Companies 
is a general partner. The parties further agreed that respondents 
should have until and including October 28, 1983 to respond in 
writing to the merits of the contentions of Worthington & Kimball 
set forth in their motion to reopen the hearing. 
\ r: 
The arbitrators, therefore, vacated the hearing set for 
October 24, 1983 and granted Worthington & Kimball until November 4, 
1983 to respond to any arguments presented by respondents as to 
the effect of the assignment on the rights and liabilities of 
C & A Development Company, C & A Enterprises and C & A Companies 
in the matter before the arbitrators. The arbitrators further 
directed that the memoranda to be filed by each party should also 
state the position of such party as to the assessment of costs and 
fees in this proceeding. 
After receipt of said briefs the arbitrators met on 
November 7, 1983 and, based on the evidence heard, the exhibits 
introduced, the briefs of counsel and the visit to and inspection 
of the construction site, make the following Findings: 
1. On or about July 2, 1980 Worthington & Kimball and 
C & A Development Company entered into a contract on AGC Form No. 
6a "Design - Build Agreement between Owner and Contractor." The 
only significant amendment to that form made by the parties was in 
paragraph 2.5.2, to which was added the following language: 
Any and all test borings, soil sampling and pre-determined 
construction surveys and investigations (other than site 
survey) shall be done by contractor, if contractor fails 
or neglects to obtain such borings, testings, etc., 
contractor shall assume all liability for any failures in 
the building as a result of any deficiency that may 
result therefrom. 
2. We construe that language to mean that the parties 
intended that if (a) the contractor employed a competent person 
to conduct such borings, testings, etc., (b) fully informed that 
person of the general nature of the planned construction, (c) the 
borings, testings, etc., were performed and the report thereof 
was made in accordance with standards of the industry, (d) the 
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plans and specifications provided by the contractor under paragraph 
2.1 complied with the findings and recommendations of the person 
employed to make such borings, testings, etc., and (e) the contractor 
followed such plans and specifications in the construction of the 
building, the contractor is relieved of any liability for any 
failures or defects in the building resulting from soil conditions, 
differential settlement and the like. 
3. In March, 19 81, with the consent of Worthington & 
Kimball, the original contract between Worthington & Kimball and 
C & A Development was as'signed by C & A Development to C & A 
Enterprises, an Arizona partnership of which C & A Companies, Inc. 
is a general partner. In addition, the property on which the 
building was constructed was deeded by C & A Development to C & A 
Enterprises. By reason thereof, references in this award to "owner" 
shall be deemed to include both C & A Enterprises and C & A 
Development, jointly and severally. We believe any allocation of 
payment of the award is to be determined by agreement between them, 
without necessity of any ruling by the arbitrators. The obligation 
of C & A Companies, Inc. under the award is only as a general 
partner of C & A Enterprises and is determined by the provisions 
of Section 48-1-12, Utah Code Annotated. 
4. The unpaid balance of the contract price, as adjusted 
by change orders as provided in Article 9 of the Contract, to which 
Worthington & Kimball is entitled to be paid as provided in Article 
11 of the contract, is $430,053.00, subject to such deductions 
therefrom as the arbitrators find to be warranted under the terms 
of the contract and the evidence received with respect to the claims 
of the owner. 
5. The owner is entitled to a reduction of the said 
unpaid balance in the sum of $52,922.00, allocated as follows: 
a. Repairs to asphalt in parking lots and drives, 
$25,125.00; 
b. Punch list items - this includes correction of 
cantilever area of roof over dock, $10,000.00; 
c. Repair of external walls due to separation and 
spalling, $2,500.00; and 
d. Credit for payments by C & A to Worthington & 
Kimball- subcontractors, $15,297.00. 
6. All other claims of the owner have been carefully and 
fully considered, but are denied on one or more of the following 
grounds: 
a. Not the responsibility of the contractor; 
b. Not supported by the evidence; 
c. Not authorized by or barred by the terms of the 
contract between the parties, including the plans 
and specifications; 
d. Not quantified by reliable evidence; 
e. Not included within the scope of the work to be 
performed by the contractor; 
f. Barred by acts or failure to act of the owner; and 
g. Abandonment of the claim during hearings or in 
briefs. 
7. The contractor is entitled to interest at the rate of 
15% per annum on the sum of $377,131.00 from December 1, 1981 until 
paid by owner. We select that rate in part as a measure of damages 
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to Worthington & Kimball for the unreasonable withholding of the 
balance of the contract price. 
8. All other claims of the contractor have been fully 
and carefully considered, but are denied on one or more of the 
following grounds: 
a. Not the responsibility of the owner; 
b. Not supported by the evidence; 
c. Not authorized by the contract or barred by the 
terms of the contract, including the plans and 
specifications; 
d. Already covered in change orders executed by owner 
and contractor; 
e. Not quantified by reliable evidence; 
f. Are otherwise contained in the award herein made; 
g. Barred by acts or failure to act of the contractor; 
and 
h. Abandonment of claim during hearings or in briefs. 
9. Owner shall pay to contractor the sum of $377,131.00 
plus interest as provided in paragraph 7 above upon the contractor 
filing with the office of the American Arbitration Association in 
Denver, Colorado lien waivers from the contractor and all its 
subcontractors. This requirement does not include Robert E. Lee 
doing business as Ogden Industrial Plastic, who we find is not a 
subcontractor of Worthington & Kimball. 
10. Administrative fees and arbitrators1 fees and 
expenses as determined by the American Arbitration Association office 
in Denver, Colorado shall be borne 75.0% by owner and 25.0% by 
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Worthington & Kimball. All other expenses shall be allocated as 
follows: 
a. The expenses of witnesses for either side shall 
be paid by the party producing such witness 
including witnesses produced in response to the 
arbitrators' letter to counsel dated May 27, 1983; 
b. Cost of the stenographic record, equally between 
owner and Worthington & Kimball, unless they shall 
have otherwise agreed prior to the receipt of this 
award; 
c. All other expenses of the arbitration, as described 
generally in paragraph 50 of the Construction 
Industry Arbitration rules, shall be born equally 
by the parties; and 
d. The nature and amount of such expenses shall be 
determined by the Denver office of the American 
Arbitration Association. 
DATED this "7U day of November, 1983. 
a^;^ 
Peter W. B i l l i n g s / Chairman 
George^y. ~ 
B. Lue B e t t i l y e r r 
0 4 3 ^ 2 ? 
Robert F. Bentley, Esq. 
7525 East Camelback Road 
Scottsdale, Arizona 85251 
(602) 947-7775 
Attorney for C & A Development Co. 
and C & A Enterprises 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
OF WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
WORTHINGTON & KIMBALL CONSTRUCTION 
COMPANY, a Utah General Partnership, 
et al, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
C & A DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, an 
Arizona corporation, et al, 
Defendants. 
Defendants, C & A DEVELOPMENT COMPANY and C & A 
ENTERPRISES, by and through their attorney, ROBERT F. BENTLEY, hereby 
oppose Plaintifffs Motion to Confirm Award and move this Court 
pursuant to Section 78-31-16, Utah Code Annotated, to vacate the 
award of the American Arbitration Association, on the grounds that: 
(A) The arbitrators exceeded their powers by making an 
award after the time within which the award was to be made had 
expired, by reopening the hearing at a time which would prevent the 
making of the award within the time agreed upon by the parties 
without agreement of the parties to extension of the time, and by 
making an award upon matters not submitted to them and not within the 
terms of the agreement. 
RIO*. 
FILED 
DEC 5 ikmtf'e 
OPPOSITION TO 
MOTION TO CONFIRM AWARD 
AND MOTION TO VACATE AWARD 
Civil No. 83337 
(B) The arbitrators after the close of the hearing received 
additional evidence in support of Plaintiff's claims but refused to 
receive additional evidence from Defendants, C & A DEVELOPMENT 
COMPANY and C & A ENTERPRISES, in support of their claims as 
Respondents in said arbitration. 
(C) There was evident partiality of the arbitrators as 
evidenced by the irregularities in procedure and the award. 
(D) The award was procured by fraud or other undue means. 
This motion is supported by the attached Memorandum. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 30th day of November, 1983. 
Robert F. Bentley 
7525 East Camelback *Road 
Scottsdale, Arizona 85251 
Attorney for C & A Development 
Co. and C & A Enterprises 
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MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO CONFIRM 
AND IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO VACATE 
Defendants, C & A DEVELOPMENT COMPANY and C & A 
ENTERPRISES, have opposed Plaintiff's Motion to Confirm Award and 
have moved this Court to vacate the award made by the American 
Arbitration Association in the matter entitled WORTHINGTON & KIMBALL 
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, a Utah General Partnership, Claimant, vs. C & A 
DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, an Arizona corporation, C & A ENTERPRISES, an 
Arizona partnership, and C & A COMPANIES, INC., an Arizona 
corporation, a copy of which Award is attached to Plaintiff's Motion 
to Confirm Award. The award must be vacated as the arbitrators 
exceeded their powers, were guilty of misconduct in refusing to hear 
evidence pertinent and material to the controversy, there was evident 
partiality in the arbitrators and the award was procured by fraud or 
other undue means. 
I. The arbitrators exceeded their powers by making an 
award after the time specified had expired. The parties agreed by 
contract that the rules of the American Arbitration Association would 
apply. With respect to time for award, the rules provide: 
"The award shall be made promptly by the arbitrator and, 
unless otherwise agreed by the parties, or specified by law, 
not later than thirty (30) days from the date of closing of 
the hearings . . . .ff 
Rule 41, Construction Industry Arbitration Rules, a copy of which is 
attached hereto as Exhibit "A". As no other time was agreed upon by 
the parties and the law (U.C.A. §78-31-8) specifies that the award 
must be made within sixty (60) days from the time of the appointment 
of the arbitrators, if the time is not fixed in the arbitration 
agreement, the time within which the award must be made is thirty 
(30) days from the date of closing the hearings. The hearings were 
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closed on September 2, 1983. See Exhibit "B" attached hereto. Thus, 
the award must have been made on or before October 2nd in order to be 
within the time as specified by the parties. 
The arbitration rules specify that if no other specific 
time is set forth in the contract and the hearings are reopened, the 
award must be made within thirty (30) days from closing of the 
reopened hearings. Rule 36, Construction Industry Arbitration Rules. 
See Exhibit "A". However, the rule also provides that: 
"If the reopening of the hearing would prevent the making of 
the award within the specific time agreed upon by the 
parties in the contract out of which the controversy has 
arisen, the matter may not be reopened, unless the parties 
agree upon the extension of such time limit." 
Notwithstanding this limitation, the hearing was reopened 
over the objection of Defendants, C & A DEVELOPMENT COMPANY and C & A 
ENTERPRISES, and without their consent to extension of the time 
limit. In fact, they specifically objected to any reopening of the 
hearing which would permit Plaintiff to submit additional evidence 
with respect to their claims which should have been but was not 
submitted in prior hearings without also permitting C & A DEVELOPMENT 
COMPANY and C & A ENTERPRISES to submit additional evidence with 
respect to their defenses and claims which they had not presented 
because the arbitrators directed that the surrebuttal case be limired 
to two (2) days. See Exhibits "C" (Plaintiffs* Motion for Reopening 
of Hearing), "D" (the Response thereto), "E" (the American 
Arbitration Association letter advising that the hearing had been 
reopened), "F" (the panel's Notice of Hearing) and "G" (letter from 
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the attorney for C & A DEVELOPMENT COMPANY and C & A ENTERPRISES 
objecting thereto). 
Inasmuch as reopening of the hearing did not extend the 
time within which the award was to be made, the arbitrators had no 
power to make an award after October 2, 1983, and the award made must 
be vacated. 
The arbitrators also exceeded their powers by making an 
award which was not within the contract. The arbitration rules 
provide that: "the arbitrator may grant any relief or remedy which 
is just and equitable and within the terms of the agreement of the 
parties" Rule 43, Construction Industry Arbitration Rules, see 
Exhibit "A" (emphasis added).The arbitrators fixed interest at 
fifteen percent (15%) per annum "in part as a measure of damages 
for the unreasonable withholding of the balance of the contract 
price". See Award, pages 5-6. Neither the contract nor any other 
agreement of the parties provided for damages intended to be punitive 
in nature such as these. The contract specified the rate of interest 
which payments due but unpaid should bear. Section 11.1.4, page 8. 
Both parties submitted evidence as to the appropriate rate (Plaintiff 
claimed that prime plus two was the appropriate rate while Defendants 
submitted evidence that after December 1, 1981, the construction loan 
rate was at seventy-five percent of prime or less than the legal rate 
of ten percent). 
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In rejecting the evidence submitted by all parties as to 
the appropriate interest and arbitrarily choosing a rate of fifteen 
percent in part to punish C & A DEVELOPMENT COMPANY and C & A 
ENTERPRISES for being unreasonable, the arbitrators exceeded their 
powers. (That such interest was intended as a penalty is further 
evidenced by the panel's letter of July 14, 1933 [prior to the 
surrebuttal case of C & A DEVELOPMENT COMPANY and C & A ENTERPRISES] 
which specifically requested argument as to what "penalty" should be 
assessed against C & A if it withheld an unreasonable amount from the 
final request for payment. Items 4 (A) and (B), page 2, Exhibit 
"H" . ) 
Because the arbitrators exceeded their powers by making an 
award which was not "within the agreement of the parties", the award 
must be vacated. 
In addition, should it be determined that the award is not 
defective as a result of the failure to make an award within the 
time agreed by the parties, the panel exceeded their powers by 
making an award against C & A DEVELOPMENT COMPANY despite the fact 
that Plaintiff had withdrawn any claim against C & A DEVELOPMENT 
COMPANY in the Reply of Worthington & Kimball regarding the 
respective liability of the C & A entities (C & A DEVELOPMENT 
COMPANY, C & A ENTERPRISES and C & A COMPANIES, INC.). Plaintiff 
stated, "Because of the individual liability of the general partners 
of C & A Enterprises, W&K (Worthington & Kimball) will not pursue the 
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secondary liability of C & A DEVELOPMENT". Exhibit "I", page 2. 
Thus, Plaintiffs withdrew from the arbitrators' consideration any 
claim against C & A DEVELOPMENT COMPANY based upon its secondary 
liability. Despite the withdrawal of this claim, the arbitrators 
made an award against C & A DEVELOPMENT COMPANY jointly and severally 
with C & A ENTERPRISES. In so doing, they exceeded their powers by 
making an award upon a matter not submitted to them. As a result, 
the award must be vacated. 
II. In addition to exceeding their powers, the arbitrators 
were guilty of misconduct in refusing to permit C & A DEVELOPMENT 
COMPANY and C & A ENTERPRISES to supplement their surrebuttal case, 
and the award must be vacated. 
As has been discussed above, the surrebuttal case was 
limited to two days at the arbitrators' direction. In an effort to 
complete the hearing as directed, C & A DEVELOPMENT COMPANY limited 
the number of witnesses and the areas of evidence on surrebuttal. 
When Plaintiff moved to reopen the hearing to submit additional 
evidence because it had failed to substantiate a claim against any 
Respondent other than C & A DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, C & A ENTERPRISES 
and C & A DEVELOPMENT COMPANY requested that if the hearings be 
reopened, they be permitted to supplement their surrebuttal case. 
Plaintiff in its Motion to reopen the hearing argued facts 
which were not in evidence from the hearings. By so doing, the 
Plaintiff attempted to ensure that even if the hearings were not 
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reopened, the evidence which they desired to present would be before 
the panel. Plaintiff's actions in this respect were clearly 
improper. 
In receiving additional proofs from Plaintiff but refusing 
to permit C & A DEVELOPMENT COMPANY and C & A ENTERPRISES to 
supplement their surrebuttal case, the arbitrators were guilty of 
misconduct and the award must be vacated. 
III. The award must be vacated because of evident 
partiality of the arbitrators. That partiality is evidenced by the 
penalty interest assessed in the award, by making C & A DEVELOPMENT 
COMPANY jointly and severally liable with C & A ENTERPRISES in the 
award despite the withdrawal of claims against C & A DEVELOPMENT 
COMPANY by Plaintiffs, and by reopening hearings to permit Plaintiff 
to supplement its case but refusal to permit C & A DEVELOPMENT 
COMPANY and C & A ENTERPRISES to supplement theirs, all as discussed 
above. 
In addition, partiality is evident from the discussion in 
the Award regarding the modification to the contract regarding the 
soil testing. The panel indicates five items which if followed by 
the contractor, relieved the contractor of liability for failures or 
defects in the building resulting from soil conditions, differential 
settlement and the like. Of the five set forth, it was clear from 
the evidence submitted that at least two were not fulfilled by the 
contractor. The contractor did not fully inform the person 
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conducting soil tests of the general nature of the planned 
construction. Mr. Rollins who performed the soils test, testified 
that he did not knew what type of building was going to be 
constucted. See Exhibit "JM, an excerpt of the testimony of Ralph 
Rollins, p. 1980, lines 17-20. In addition, the plans and 
specifications provided by the contractor did not comply with the 
findings and recommendations of the person employed to make such 
borings. Plaintiff did not dispute that its architect failed to 
proportion the footings as recommended by the soils report. In fact, 
in their brief they stated that an engineering decision was made not 
to follow that recommendation. Clearly, Plaintiff is not relieved 
from liability for engineering decisions to deviate from the 
recommendations of the soils expert. Despite failure to conform to 
two of the five requirements set forth by the arbitrators, , the 
arbitrators failed to make any award for damages due to differential 
settlement despite clear evidence that differential settlement has 
occurred and caused damage to the building. 
Due to the evident partiality of the arbitrators, the award 
must be vacated. 
IV. The award must be vacated as it was procured by fraud 
or other undue means. C & A DEVELOPMENT COMPANY and C & A 
ENTERPRISES claimed in the arbitration proceedings that a credit for 
items which were included in the contract at the time it was signed, 
were not provided by Plaintiff and yet were included in the contract 
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price. However, the items were shown on the contract plans which 
were initialed by the parties. Plaintiff claimed that the deletions 
occurred prior to execution of the contract and were reflected by a 
reduction in the price. Despite the clear requirements of the 
contract plans, Plaintiff claimed that an unsigned set of redlined 
plans were the contract drawings though none of the personnel of 
C & A DEVELOPMENT COMPANY who testified had ever seen them prior to 
the arbitration hearing. C & A DEVELOPMENT COMPANY and C & A 
ENTEPRISES are preparing a discovery request which will include 
documents in the hands of Plaintiff which they believe will 
demonstrate that the initialed plans were in fact those which defined 
the contract and that the contract price includes those items which 
Plaintiff claims were deleted from the contract and price prior to 
execution. C & A DEVELOPMENT COMPANY and C & A ENTERPRISES believe 
that with those documenrs, they can demonstrate that the award was 
procured through fraud or other undue means and that the award must 
be vacated. At such time as the documents have been provided to 
C & A DEVELOPMENT COMPANY and C & A ENTERPRISES, they will supplement 
their memorandum with respect to this issue. 
Because of defects in the award and procedure of the 
arbitration, adequate grounds exist for vacation of the award by this 
Court. Despite the interests of the Court in resolution of disputes, 
the Legislature has specified that arbitration proceedings which do 
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not meet certain criteria may not be confirmed. That is the case in 
this matter. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 30th day of November, 1983. 
Robert F. Bentley 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing Opposition to Motion to Confirm Award and Motion to 
Vacate Award, postage thereon fully prepaid, this 30th day of 
November, 1983, to the following: 
Robert F. Babcock 
Walstad, Kasimer, Tansey & Ittig 
185 South State Street 
Suite 1000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
LaVar E. Stark 
Attorney for Stewart Title 
2651 Washington Boulevard #10 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Steven M. Ashby 
Holbrook Company, Inc. 
151 North 600 West 
P. 0. Box 226 
Kaysvilie, Utah 84037 
Joseph Smith Plumbing 
483 Eat Maryrose Drive 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
Thomas A. Duffin 
Attorney for Otto Buehner 
311 South State 
Suite 380 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Michael Glassman 
Attorney for Redd Roofing 
First Security Bank Bldg. #1000 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
David B. Smith 
First Interstate Bank of Arizona 
P. O. Box 20551 
Phoenix, Arizona 85036 
Robert F. Bentley 
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shall submit to questions or other examination. 
The arbitraior may vary thn procedure bu: shall 
afford full and equal opportunity to the parties for 
the presentation of any materia! or relevant proofs. 
Exhibits, when offered by either party, may be 
received in evidence b> the arbitrator. 
The names and addresses of all witnesses and ex-
hibits in order received shall be made a party of 
the record. 
30. Arbitration in the Absence of a Party 
Unless the law provides to the contrar> .the arbitra-
tion may proceed in the absence of any party, who. 
after due notice, fails to be present or fails to ob-
tain an adjournment. An award shall not be made 
solely on the default of apart}. The arbitrator shall 
require the party who is present tc submit such 
evidence as deemed necessary for the making of an 
award. 
3 1 . Evidence 
The parties may offer such evidence as they desire 
and shall produce such additional evidence as the 
arbitrator may deem necessary to an understand-
ing and determination of the dispute. An arbitra-
tor authorized by law to subpoena witnesses or doc-
uments may do so upon tne request of any party. 
or independent!}. The arbitator shall be the judge 
of the admissibility of the evidence offered and 
conformity to legal ruler of evidence shall not be 
necessan; All evidence shall be taken in the presence 
of aU of the arbitrators and an of the parties, except 
where any of the parties is absent in default o: has 
waived his or her right to be present. 
32. Evidence by Affidavit and Filing of 
Documents 
The arbitrator may receive and consider the evi-
dence of witnesses by affidavit, giving it such 
weight as seems appropriate after consideration of 
any objections made to its admission. 
All documents not filed with the arbitrator at the 
hearing, but arranged for at the hearing or subse-
quently by agreement of the panic:, shall be fiied 
with the AAA for transmission to the arbitrator. 
All parties shall be afforded opportunity to exam-
ine such documents. 
33 . Inspection or Investigation 
.An arbitrator rinding it necessary to make an in-
spection or investigation in connection with the 
arbitration shall direct the AAA to so advise the 
parties. The arbitrator shall set the time and the 
AAA shall notify the parties thereof. Any party 
who so desires may be present at such inspection 
or investigation. In the event that one or both par-
ties are not present at the inspection or investiga-
tion, the arbitrator shall make a verbal or written 
report to the parties and afford them an opportu-
nity to comment. 
34. Conservation of Property 
The arbitrator ma\ issue such orders as may be 
deemed necessary to safeguard the property which 
is the subject matter of the arbitration without 
prejudice to the rights of the parties or to the final 
determination of the dispute. 
35. Closing of Hearings 
Tne arbitrator shall specifically inquire of the par-
ties whether they have any further proofs to offer 
or witnesses to be heard. Upon receiving negative 
replies, the arb:trator shall declare trie hearings 
closed and a minute thereof shall be recorded. If 
briefs arc to be filed, the hearings shall be declared 
closed as of the final date set by the arbitrator for 
the receipt of briefs. If documents are to be fiied as 
provided for in Section 32 and the dare set for their 
receipt is laier U;an that se: for the receipt o^briefs. 
the later date shall be the date of closing the hear-
ing. The time limit within which the arbitraior is 
required tc make an award shall commence to run. 
in the absence nf other agreements by the parties, 
upon the ciusing of the hearings. 
36. Reopening of Hearings 
The hearings may be reopened by the arbitrator at 
will, or upon application of a party at any time be-
fore the award is made. If the reopening of the hear-
ing would prevent the making of the award within 
the specific time agreed upon by the parties in the 
contract out oi which the controvers} has arisen, 
the matte: ma\ not be reopened, unless the parties 
agree upon the extension of such tune limit. When 
no specific date is fixed ir. the contract, the arbitra-
tor may reopen the hearings, and the arbitrator 
shall have thirty days from the closing of the re-
opened hearings within which to make an award. 
37. Waiver of Oral Hearings 
The parties may provide, by written agreement, for 
the waiver of oral hearings. If the parties are un-
able to agree as to the procedure, the AAA shall 
specify a fair and equitable procedure. 
38. Waiver of Rules 
Any party who proceeds with the arbitration after 
knowledge that any provision or requirement of 
these Rules has not been complied with and who 
fails to state an objection thereto in writing, shall 
be deemed to have waived the right to object. 
39. Extensions of Time 
The parties may modify any period of time by 
mutual agreement. The AAA for good cause may 
extend any period of time established by these 
Rules, except the time for making the award. The 
AAA shall notify the parties of any such extension 
of time and its reason therefor. 
40 . Communication with Arbitrator and 
Serving of Notices 
There shall be no communication between the par-
ties and an arbitrator other than at oral hearings. 
Any other oral or written communications from 
the parties to the arbitrator shall be directed to the 
AAA for transmittal to the arbitrator. 
Each party to an agreement which provides for ar-
bitration under these Rules shall be deemed to have 
consented that any papers, notices or process nec-
essary or proper for the initiation or continuation 
of an arbitration under these Rules and for any 
court action in connection therewith or for the 
entry of judgment on any award made thereunder 
maybe served upon such party by mail addressed to 
such party or its attorney at the last known ad-
dress or by personal service, within or without the 
state wherein the arbitration is to be held (whether 
such party be within or without the United States 
of America), provided that reasonable opportunity 
to be heard with regard thereto has been granted 
such party. 
4 1 . Time of Award 
The award shall be made promptly by the arbitra-
toi and. unless otherwise agreed by the parties, or 
specified by law, not later than thirty days from 
the date of closing the hearings, or if oral hearings 
have been waived, from the date of transmitting 
the final statements and proofs to the arbitrator. 
42. Form of Award 
The award shall be in writing and shall be signed 
either by the sole arbitrator or by at least a major-
ity if there be more than one. It shall be executed 
in the manner required by law. 
43. Scope of Award 
Tne arbitrator ma> gram an> remedy or relief 
which is just and equitable and within the terms of 
the agreement of the parties. The arbitrator, in the 
award, shall assess arbitration fees and expenses as 
provided in Sections 48 and 50 equal!\ or in favor 
of any party and. in the event any administrative 
f^2s or expenses are due the AAA. in favor of the 
AAA. 
44. Award upon Settlement 
If the parties settle their dispute during the course 
of the arbitration, the arbitrator, upon their re-
quest, may set forth the terms of the agreed settle-
ment in an award. 
45 . Delivery of Award to Parties 
Parties shall accept as legal delivery of the award 
the placing of the award or a true copy thereof in 
the mail b\ the AAA. addressed to such party at 
its las; known address o' to its attorney, or person-
al service o: the award, or the filing of the award 
in any manner winch may be prescribed by law. 
46. Release of Documents for Judicial Pro-
ceedings 
The AAA shall, upon the written request of a par-
ty furnish t<> sue!: partv. at it* expense, certified 
facsimiles of an\ papers in the AAA's possession 
that may be required in ui-iieia! proceedings re-
lating to the arbitration. 
47. Applications to Court 
No judicial proceeding* by a party relating to the 
subject matter of the arbitration shall be deemed a 
waiver of the party's right to arbitrate. 
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September 12, 1983 
Robert F. Babcock, Esq. 
Walstad, Kasirner, Tansey 
& Ittig 
185 S. State Street, Ste 1000 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Robert F. Bentley 
General Counsel 
C & A Companies, Inc. 
P.O. Box 1549 
Scottsdale, AZ 84252 
L.M. Henriksen dba 
Western States Construction 
790 East 400 North 
Linden, UT 84062 
RE: 77 110 0130 82 
Worthington & Kimball 
Construction Company 
-anc-
C & A Enterprises; 
C & A Development; 
C & A Companies; 
L.M. Henriksen dba 
Western States Const.; 
Kolbrook Corripany, Inc. 
Staker Paving and 
Construction Company 
Salt Lake City or Ogden, 
UT 
Steven M. Ashby, Controller 
Kolbrook Company, Inc. 
151 North 600 West 
P.O. Box 226 
Kaysville, UT 84037 
Joseph C. Rust, Esq. 
Kesler & Rust 
2000 Beneficial Bldg. 
36 S. State Street 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Gentlemen: 
This will confirm that the hearings in the above-
captioned arbitration were held on July 14 and 15, 1983 
This will advise that the Arbitrators declared the 
hearings closed on September 2, 1983. 
"EXHIBIT B" 
September 12, 1983 
Pace 2 
Therefore, the Av/ard will be due thirty (30) days 
thereafter or by, on or before October 2, 1983. 
Very truly yours, 
<)>. ~ Up, 
Mark E. Appel ' ' 
Reaional Director 
11] 
MEA:km 
xc: Peter W. Billings 
George E, Lyman 
B. Lue Bettilyon 
Robert F. Babcock and 
3ames 3. Tansey of 
WALSTAD, KASIMER, TANSEY & 1TTIG 
Attorneys for Claimant 
185 South State, Suite 1000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 531-7000 
BEFORE THE AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION 
WORTHINGTON 6c KIMBALL CONSTRUCTION 
COMPANY, a Utah general partnership, 
Claimant, 
vs. 
C & A DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, 
an Arizona corporation, C & A ENTERPRISES, 
an Arizona partnership, C & A COMPANIES, 
INC., an Arizona corporation, 
Respondents. 
Pursuant to Rule 36 of the Construction Industry Arbitration Rules of the 
American Arbitration Association Claimant W & K hereby moves the panel to reopen 
the hearing to clarify an issue raised for the first time in Respondents1 Reply Brief as 
to the status of C & A Enterprises and C oc A Companies, Inc. It is and has been 
the understanding of W & K that there is and has been no dispute that all three C & 
A parties are jointly liable for the claims of W & K. 
The facts summarized hereinafter, evidences that all three C & A entities 
are jointly and severally liable. 
1. The contract was initially entered into between W & K and C & A 
Development Company. Article 14 of said contract requires written consent to assign 
the contract. 
2. C & A Development obtained the written consent of W 4 K to assign 
its contract to C Sc A Enterprises. 
MOTION FOR REOPENING 
OF HEARING 
No. 77-110-0130-82 
- 2 -
3. The Cer t i f i ca te of Substantial Complet ion was directed to C <5c A 
Enterprises. (See Exh. 23B behind Tab 8) 
4. The property was deeded by C 6c A Development to C & A Enterprises 
t r 
of which C & A Companies is a general par tner , (See the Deed of Trust and Security 2 
Agreement, the last document behind Tab 28) 
5. Both of the le t ters w r i t t en by Robert F. Bentley to W & K and Robert 
E. Lee were signed by Robert F. Bent ley, General Counsel for Permaloy Corporation 
and C & A Enterprises. (See Exhs. 67, D) 
6. A i l of the pay requests were submitted to C a A Companies, the partner 
responsible for handling payments. (See Exh. 23A) 
7. As fur ther involvement of C & A Companies see the let ter of Richard 
Campbell on C 3c A Companies' stat ionery in response to the f ina l pay application of W 
3c K (Exh, 24) and le t ter of Gary Worthington to C 3c A Companies (Exh. E). 
8. The or iginal arb i t ra t ion was f i led solely against C 3c A Enterprises. 
9. The amended claim for a rb i t ra t ion brought in C fie A Development and C 
3c A Companies. 
10. The answer f i led by C 3c A Enterprises and the Counterclaim of C 3c 
A Enterprises states on page one in the f i r s t paragraph "named Respondent and 
Counterc la imant, a party to an arb i t ra t ion agreement contained in a wr i t ten contract . . 
, . " . Fur ther , paragraph two of C 3c A Enterprise's response states "Respondent also 
demands arb i t ra t ion pursuant to the cont rac t . . . ." . 
11. The le t ter from Holbrook to the American Arb i t ra t ion Association dated 
3uiy 15, 1982 refers to the contract between C 3c A Enterprises and Holbrook. (See 
also said cont rac t behind Tab 19) 
12. The let ter of counsel for Respondent (C 4 A Enterprises) dated August 
12, 1982, refers to the contract between W 3c K and Respondent (C 3c A Enterprises). 
QA 
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13. The ietter of October 12, 1982 to American Arbitration Association from 
counsel for C & A refers to the claims of C & A Enterprises against W & K and the 
subcontractors for failure to provide for arbitration in their subcontracts as required 
by the "agreement with C & A Enterprises". 
14. The letter of April 14, 1983 from counsel for Respondents refers both 
to "Respondent C & Afs counterclaims" and "pursuant to the contract between 
Worthington & Kimball Construction Company and C & A. . . .". 
15. The correspondence from Respondents to the AAA was typically on the 
letterhead of C & A Companies, Inc. 
16. From the beginning of the hearing, including the opening statement, all 
parties, including counsel for Respondents, referred to the three C & A Entities as 
simply C & A. 
17. The 58 page Respondents1 Brief simply refers to "C <k A". Tne only 
reference in the text of the Brief to a specific entity is found on pages 35-36 which 
states C <5c A Enterprises should be awarded a sum for business interruption damages in 
an amount of between $"80,000 and $522,000. Further, under Section 9 entitled "Award" 
the amounts requested to be awarded to "C <5c A" refer to all amounts alleged at the 
hearing. Lastly, on page 57 of Respondents1 Brief it states "Respondents respectfully 
request the panel to enter an award in their favor and to hold that Petitioners are no 
(sic) entitled to an award". 
It is the position of W & K that the "pleadings" and correspondence with 
the American Arbitration Association, the evidence presented at the hearing, the posture 
of "C & A" at the hearing and in its brief in consistently referring to all three C & 
A entities as "C & A" even to the requesting of relief for C & A Enterprises clarifies 
this issue. 
Nonetheless, if the panel feels it would be helpful to clarify once and for 
all the relationship between the C oc A entities W & K would request a short reopening 
. 4 -
of the hearing for this sole purpose. The rehearing would not take more than a couple 
of hours and could easily be held within the time needed for the panel to make the 
award. Further, it should not delay the panel in making the award. 
Respectfully submitted this .5° day of August, 1983. 
WALSTAD, KASIMER, TANSEY & ITTIG 
By: 
Robert F. Babcock 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
Motion for Reopening of Hearing, postage thereon fully prepaid, this ; n ' " day of 
August, 1983 to the following: 
Robert F. Bentley and 
Vaughn Armstrong 
C & A Development Co. 
P. O. Box 1549 
Scottsdale, Arizona 85252 
<Uui;,; ^ \ \ > ; d ' u ^ -
\ 
IN THE ARBITRATION TRIBUNALS OF THE 
AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION 
Worthington & Kimball Construction Company 
-and-
C & A Development Company, C & A Enterprises 
and C & A Companies, Inc. No. 77-110-013-82 
-and-
L.M. Henriksen d/b/a Western States Construction, 
Holbrook Company, Inc. and Staker Paving and 
Construction Co. 
RESPONSE TO MOTION FOR REOPENING OF HEARING 
Respondents, C & A Development Co., C & A Enterprises, and 
C & A Companies, Inc., hereby respond to Claimant's Motion for 
Reopening of Hearing. The Motion must be denied as there is no basis 
for reopening the hearing. 
Claimant contends that the issue was first raised in 
Respondent's Reply Brief and that Claiman:: presumed that there had 
been no dispute that all three parries are jointly liable. This is 
not the case. The issue was raised at the time Claimant amended their 
Demand for Arbitration. In response to the Amended Demand, 
Respondents stated that "not all of the parties named as Respondents 
in such Amended Demand are proper parties". (This was contained in a 
letter to the American Arbitration Association, December ICth, 1982, 
which was forwarded to counsel for Claimant by the American 
Arbitration Association on December 15, 19S2. See Exhibits A & B 
attached hereto.) Clearly, Claimant was aware that there was a dispute 
as to which if any, of Respondents was liable. 
on 
Even in the absence of a specific statement questioning 
whether one or more Respondents is a proper party, basic legal 
principles require Claimant to prove a case with respect to any party 
from which it wishes to claim an award. Merely naming a party is not 
sufficient to make it jointly liable with another party. 
Claimants failed to address the issue at any time during the 
protracted hearings held in connection with this matter. In its 
briefs, Claimant did not identify any legal theory upon which joint 
liability could be based. Claimant failed to meet its burden to prove 
liability of C & A Enterprises of C & A Companies, Inc. Respondents 
had no obligation to address the issue inasmuch as it had nor been 
addressed by Claimants nor did they have an obligation to remind 
Claimant of issues which Claimant had raised bur overlooked in 
presentation of its case. Granting Claimants Motion to Reopen the 
Hearing would be inappropriate as Claimant had norice of the dispute 
as to proper parties and adequate time to prepare for and to address 
the question in the course of the hearing. Claimant's Moticr. must be 
denied. 
In addition, Claimant's Motion musr be stricken and the 
allegation and argument set forth musr not be considered by the panel. 
Claimant, by way of the Motion, improperly attempts to supplement both 
the record and its briefs. The allegations of fact with respect to 
which no evidence appears in the record and the legal arguments to 
justify an award against C & A Enterprises or C & A Companies are not 
related to the Question of whether the hearinc should be reooened. 
- 2 -
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Even if those arguments were to be considered, they do not 
establish a basis for relief against C & A Enterprises or C & A 
Companies, Inc. Worthington & Kimball's submission of the Certificate 
of Substantial Completion or the pay applications to someone other 
than C & A Development Co- does not make that other person liable 
under the contract. The fact that the property was transferred to C & 
A Enterprises or that letterhead of C & A Companies, Inc. (or Permaloy 
Corporation) was used in correspondence does not make either liable on 
the contract. The fact that a owner of a property may be entitled to 
a claim for loss of use against the party responsible for such loss 
does not imply that the owner has any liability to such other party. 
In the event that Claimant's motion is granted and the 
hearing is reopened, Respondents request that sufficient time be set 
aside that Respondents may supplement their surrebuttal case which was 
shortened by Respondents in an effort to complete the hearing m a 
timely matter. 
Respectfully submitted this 13th day of September, 1983 
C & A DEVELOPMENT CO. 
EY: /s/Vaughri S. Armstrong 
Vaughn S. Armstrong 
Assistant General Counsel 
RE££IVED OCT -
AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION 
Robert F. Babcock, Esq. 
Walstad, Kasimerr Tansey 
& Ittiq 
185 S. State Street, Ste 1000 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Robert F. Bentley 
General Counsel 
C & A Comoanies, Inc. 
P.O. Box 1549 
Scottsdale, AZ 84252 
L.M. Henriksen dba 
Western States Construction 
790 East 400 North 
Linden, UT 84062 
Steven M. Ashby, Controller 
Holbrook Comoanv, Inc. 
151 North 600 West 
P.O. Box 226 
Kaysville, UT 84037 
Joseph C. Rust, Esq. 
Kesler & Rust 
2000 Beneficial Bldg. 
36 S. State Street 
Salt Lake Cityf UT 84111 
Gentlemen: 
789 SHERMAN STREET. DENVER. COLORADO 80203 
SUITE 430 (203)831-053?= 
0 8 2 3 
September 29, 1983 
Re: 77 110 0130 82 
Worthington & Kimball 
Construction Company 
-anc-
C & A Enterprises; 
C & A Development; 
C & A Companies; 
L.M. Henriksen dba 
Western States Const.; 
Holbrook Company, Inc. 
Staker Paving and 
Construeton Company 
Salt Lake City or Ogden, 
UT 
This will advise the Parties that after careful 
consideration of the Parties' contentions, the Arbitrators, 
per Section 36 of the Rules, have determined to re-open 
hearings for the above-captioned arbitration. 
Further, this will advise the Parties that the Arbi-
trators will direct the Parties as to the necessity of 
additional hearinas or briefs in the future. 
MEA:jel 
xc : Messrs : 
Regiona l - Dire t l t6 r 
\ 
Bettilyon, Billings, and Lyman 
"EXHIBIT E" 
f\C\ 
BEFORE THE AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION 
WORTHINGTON & KIMBALL CONSTRUCTION 
COMPANY, a Utah general 
partnership. 
Claimant, 
v. 
C I A DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, an 
Arizona corporation, C & A 
ENTERPRISES, an Arizona 
partnership, and C & A COMPANIES, 
INC., an Arizona corporation, 
Respondents. 
Pursuant to the notice sent to you under date of 
September 29, 19 83 by the Denver office of the American Arbitration 
Association, the reopened hearing will be held at the 7th floor 
conference room of Fabian & Clendenin in the Continental Bank 
Building, Salt Lake City, Utah beginning at 9:00 a.m. on October 24, 
1983. The arbitrators have determined that the scope of the hearing 
shall be limited to evidence and argument as to whether any award 
can or should be made for or against any party other than the 
parties to the contract, i.e., C & A Development Company, as owner, 
partnership and L. M. Henriksen, dba Western States Construction, 
a sole proprietorship, as contractor, and as to the allocation of 
costs and fees. 
DATED this 18th day of October, 1983. 
Peter K. Billing^ Chairman 
RECEIVED OCT 2 0 iSlo 
NOTICE OF HEARING 
No. 7 7 - 1 1 0 - 0 1 3 0 - 8 2 
i - S . ^ i 
•V *4F C & A COMPANIES , I N C . 
P.O. BOX 1549 • SCOTTSDALE. ARIZONA 85252 
(602) 947-7775 
)SERT F. BENTLEY 
nior Vice President and General Counsel 
MJGHN S. ARMSTRONG 
isisiant General Counsel October 21, 1933 
Mr. Mark E. Appel 
Regional Director 
AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION 
789 Sherman Street 
Suite 430 
Denver, Colorado 60203 
Re: 77 110 0130 82 
Worthington & Kimball 
Construction Company 
-and-
C & A Enterprises 
Salt Lake City or Ogden, Utah 
Dear Mr. Appel: 
Ey telephone yesterday, we advised you that on October 20th 
we received notice from Mr. Billings that a hearing in the 
above-referenced matter had been set for 9:00 o'clock a.m. October 
24th. We advised you in that conversation and by this letter confirm 
that neither Mr. Bentley nor myself will be available on that date 
for the hearing due to prior commitments and insufficient notice. 
You indicated that you would attempt to reschedule the hearing for 
November 3rd or 4th but that Mr. Babock had net returned your call as 
of this afternoon. 
We object to the hearing being held upon inadequate notice 
and without consultation with Respondents prior to scheduling. 
In addition, we object to any hearing being held to 
determine "whether any award can or should be made for or against any 
party other than the parties to the contract", unless Respondents 
are permitted in connection with such hearing to present additional 
surrebuttal evidence which was not presented due to the panel's 
direction that the hearing was to be completed on July 15th, 19S3. 
very truiy yours, 
Vaughn S. Armstrong 
cc: Robert Babcock, Esq. 
LAW O F F I C E S or 
A B I A N & C L E N D E N I N 
Robert F. Babcock, Esq, 
Robert F. Bentlev, Esg< 
July 14, 1983 
Page Two 
2. Condition of Tanks. 
a. Who is responsible for work of Ogden Industrial 
Plastics? 
b. Was work done to the date Ogden Industrial 
Plastics was discharged in compliance with 
specifications agreed to by owner and Ogden? 
c. How handle award, if any, for Ogden1s unpaid 
portion — need for lien release? 
d. Is Worthington & Kimball entitled to 5% on any 
award made for work by Ogden Industrial Plastics? 
e. What is the effect, if any, on the issues of 
disclaimer in change orders nos. 17 and 18? 
f. If C & A is entitled to any award on this item, 
is it to be made against Worthington & Kimball 
or Ogden Industrial Plastics? 
3. What is effect on responsibility of Worthington & Kimball 
for condition of interior walls in light of inadequate 
system installed by owner to eliminate moisture and toxic 
fumes? 
4. When did "substantial completion" occur? 
a. Did C & A withhold an unreasonable amount on 
contractor's request for final payment? 
b. If so, what penalty, if any, should be assessed 
against C & A? 
c. What is the effect on any claims by C & A based 
on deficient construction in view of the one 
year warranty contained in provision 2.4.1 of 
the design-build agreement? 
d. A substantial portion of the punch list items 
appear to be nit-picking. What amount, if any, 
should be awarded on punch list items? 
L A W O F F I C E S o r 
A S I A N & C L E N D E N I N 
A Moritt OWAC CO»»»0«*T,ON 
Robert F. Babcock, Esq, 
Robert F. Bentley, Esa, 
July 14, 1983 
Page Three 
5. What is effect, if any, of the Permaloy - C & A rela 
ship on the respective responsibilities of owner and 
tractor? 
6. Rollins, Brown and Gunnell Soil Report (Exhibit K). 
a. What is the effect of the contract provision 
(1,2.5.2 as amended) with respect to such report? 
b. Did contractor deviate from any recommendations 
of the Rollins, Brcwn and Gunnell report? 
c. If not, does reliance on that report relieve 
contractor from any liability for cracks due 
to settling or expansion? 
d. Is the perimeter crack the responsibility of 
the owner, 3uehner cr Worthington & Kimball? 
e. Has settlement been excessive under the plans 
and specifications accepted by the owner? 
f. What dollar damages, if any, for (1) wall panels 
and (2) floor cracks? 
7. Roof Condition. 
a. Who is responsible for deflection of roof area 
over deck? 
b. What is effect of elimination of gravel on roof 
condition -- who is responsible? 
c. What defects, if any, exist? 
d. Are they the responsibility of the contractor? 
e. What amount, if any, be awarded C & A for any 
defects? 
8. We believe any award to Worthincton & Kimball should 
conditioned on delivery of lien waivers cr release o 
lien by all subcontractors. 
a. Hew handle Ocden Industrial Plastics1 claim? 
LAW O T S - I C E S o r 
A B I A N & C L E N D E N I N 
Robert F. Babcock, Esq. 
Robert F. Bentlev, Esq. 
July 14, 1983 
Page Four 
The foregoing is not intended to preclude either party 
from addressing any other issue which it believes to be important, 
but to suggest the issues as to which the panel needs full expo-
sition of the position of each party. 
Very truly yours, 
PWB:bw 
cc: George E. Lyman, Esq. 
B. Lue Bettilvon 
Robert F. Babcock and 
James J. Tansey of 
WALSTAD, KASIMER, TANSEY & ITTIG 
185 South State, Suite 1000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 531-7000 
BEFORE THE AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION 
WORTHINGTON & KIMBALL CONSTRUCTION : 
COMPANY, a Utah general partnership, : REPLY OF 
: WORTHINGTON & KIMBALL 
Claimant, : 
vs. : 
C & A DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, 
an Arizona corporation, C & A ENTERPRISES, 
an Arizona partnership, C Ac A COMPANIES, : No, 77-110-0130-82 
INC., an Arizona corporation, : 
Respondents. : 
Claimant hereby replies to the Response of Respondents as to the liability 
of the respective C & A entities in the subject arbitration proceeding as well as to 
the apportionment of costs and fees. 
I. PROPER PARTY 
Since C & A stipulated that the subject contract between W 4: K and C <Sc 
A Development Company was assigned by C 5c A Development Company to C & A 
Enterprises, an Arizona general partnership, in March of 1981 it was agreed that no 
further evidence would be submitted by either party. Other than the foregoing fact 
which was stipulated to by the parties as referred to in the Notice and Order from 
the panel of arbitrators dated Octooer 24, 19S3 no other evidence, subsequent to the 
hearing, was submitted by Claimant to the panel. 
Based upon the foregoing stipulation and for the sake of simplification W & 
K requests that the award be entered against C cc A Enterprises. The C <5c A entities 
acknowledge in their Response that C & A Enterprises is the appropriate party to the 
arbitration proceeding. Because of the individual liability of the general partners of C 
& A Enterprises W & K will not pursue the secondary liability of C & A Development. 
During the enforcement proceedings, if needed, W & K will pursue the joint and several 
liability of all of the partners of C <5c A Enterprises including C & A Companies, Inc. 
II. COSTS AND FEES 
Rule 43 of the Construction Industry Arbitration Rules provides: 
The arbitrator(s) may grant any remedy or relief which is 
just and equitable and within the terms of the agreement 
of the parties. The arbitrator(s), in the award, shall assess 
arbitration fees and expenses as provided in Sections 48 
and 50 ecually or in favor of any party and, in the event 
any administrative fees or expenses are due the AAA, in 
favor of the AAA. 
In addition to the administrative fees and expenses the arbitratorsT fees are 
to be allocated in accordance with the agreement of the parties to this proceeding. 
Claimant and Respondent agree that the panel may apportion the 
administrative fees paid to the AAA, the fees paid to the respective arbitrators, and 
the miscellaneous expenses of the arbitration. The parties also agree that the cost of 
witnesses is to be born by the respective parties. The only area of dispute is that of 
the cost of the stenographic record. 
In the same sense that the parties advanced the administrative fees and 
arbitrators' fees which were to be subseauently apportioned by the panel both Claimant 
and Respondent agreed to advance one half each of the cost of the stenographic record 
which cost was to be apportioned in a similar fashion to the administrative and arbitrator 
fees. 
W & K submits that in considering how to apportion the foregoing fees the 
panel should consider the nature of the claims of the respective parties, how the claims 
affected the length and therefore the cost of the hearing and the meritoriousness of 
the respective claims of the parties. In considering the foregoing W & K respectfully 
'6 -
Respectfully submitted this 4th day of November, 1983. 
WALSTAD, KASIMER, TANSEY & ITTIG 
Bv: PuijlU^A 
Robert F. Babcock 
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AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION 
* * * 
In the Matter of the 
Arbitration between 
WORTHINGTON & KIMBALL 
CONSTRUCTION CO., and 
C & A COMPANIES: L. M. 
HENRIKSEN dba WESTERN STATES 
CONSTRUCTION; HOLBROOK 
COMPANY, INC.; STAKER PAVING 
AND CONSTRUCTION COMPANY. 
Case No. 77 110 0130 82 
Testimony of: 
RALPH ROLLINS 
* * * 
; BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 22nd day of June 
i 
1983, the testimony of RALPH ROLLINS, produced as a witness 
! herein at the instance of the claimant herein, in the 
j above-entitled matter, was taken before Linda Van Tassell, 
; Certified Shorthand Reporter, Registered Professional Reporter 
i 
! and Notary public in and for the State of Utah, commencing at 
j the hour of 3:45 p.m. of said day at 700 Continental Bank 
; Building, Salt Lake City, Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
* * * 
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floor slab to the wall? 
A Yes. 
Q Is it also common that because of expected 
settlementf there occurs a perimeter crack? 
A Yes, that's true. 
Q Is it also common occurrence to have some spalling 
in some of the joints in a double tee building? 
A I think that quite often occurs. 
MR. BILLINGS: You say in here on pace 4, "It is 
our opinion if the foundations for proposed facility are 
proportioned usinc an allowable soil bearing pressure of 2,500 
pounds per square footf no serious problems will occur due to 
swelling of the subsurface soils." 
THE WITNESS: Provided — that's provided the j 
I 
recommendation is complied with. I've said in there ycu take ^ 
the necessary precautions to keep it from becoming wet / 
MR. BILLINGS: Now if a building with this . 
| double tee-type jCQjistxuction-— _ 
-^ THE WITNESS: I didn't really know at that time") 
A it was going to be a double tee-type construction, 
j MR. BILLINGS: If they followed your 
I recommendations in your soil report with that type of building ; 
and tied the floor to the walls, would you still have expected . 
a perimeter cracking? ; 
THE WITNESS: It could have occurred. One has
 : 
1980 
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Robert F. Bentley 
7425 East Camelback Road 
Scottsdale, Arizona 85251 
(602) 947-7775 
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
OF WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
WORTHINGTON & KIMBALL CONSTRUCTION 
COMPANY, a Utah General Partnership, 
et al, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
C & A DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, et al, 
Defendants 
NO. 83387 ' 
NOTICE OF APPEARANCE 
The undersigned, Robert F. Bentley, hereby gives notice of 
his appearance of counsel for C & A Enterprises and C & A Development 
Co. in the above-referenced cause of action. 
RESPECTFULLY SUEMITTED this 30th day of November, 1983 
-f$M/& 
Robert F. Bentley 
Attorney for Defendants 
C & A Development Company, 
C & A Enterprises, and 
Permaloy Corporation 
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I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing Notice of Hearing, postage thereon fully prepaid, this 
30th day of November, 1983, to the following: 
Robert Babcock 
WALSTAD, KASIMER, TANSEY & ITTIG 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
185 South State, Suite 1000 
Salot Lake City, Utah 84111 
LaVar E. Stark 
Attorney for Stewart Title 
2651 Washington Blvd. #10 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Thomas A. Duffin 
Attorney for Otto Buehner 
311 South State 
Suite 380 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Michael Glassman 
Attorney for Redd Roofing 
First Security Bank Bldg. #1000 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Steven M. Ashby 
Holbrook Company, Inc. 
151 North 600 West 
P.O. Box 226 
Kaysville, Utah 84037 
David B. Smith 
First Interstate 
P.O. Box 20551 
Phoenix, Arizona 
Bank of Arizona 
85036 
0 4 3 C £ b 
Robert F. Bentley 
7525 East Camelback Road 
Scottsdale, Arizona 85251 
(602)-947-7775 
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FILED - ~ ^ _ _ _ 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
OF WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
WORTHINGTON & KIMBALL CONSTRUCTION ) 
COMPANY, a Utah General Partnership, ) 
et al, ) 
Plaintiffs, ) 
C & A 
vs. 
DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, et al, ) 
Defendants) 
NO. 83387 
MOTION TO CONTINUE 
Comes now, Defendants C & A Development Co. and C & A 
Enterprises, by and through their attorney undersigned and hereby 
request that this Court continue the hearing set for December 2nd, 
1983, in the above captioned cause to a time mutually convenient to 
this Court and the parties thereto as and for the reason that 
Defendant's attorney will be in Mexico City on previously scheduled 
business and further Defendant's attorney will be in Chicago the week 
of December 5th on corporate business. Attorney for Defendant would 
be able to attend a hearing on Friday, December 9th, 1983, if said 
date would be acceptable to this Court. 
Further, moving Defendants have made a Motion to Vacate the 
Award. In order to permit Plaintiff adequate time to respond, both 
mfi 
Plaintiff's Motion to Confirm and Defendants' Motion to Vacate should 
be heard together at a later hearing. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 30th day of November, 1933. 
Robert F. Bentley 
7525 East Camelback RoAd 
Scottsdale, Arizona 85251 
Attorney for C & A Companies, Inc, 
and C 6c A Enterpriese 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing Notice of Hearing, postage thereon fully prepaid, this 
30th day of November, 1983, to the following: 
Robert Babcock 
WALSTAD, KASIMER, TANSEY & ITTIG 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
185 South State, Suite 1000 
Salot Lake City, Utah 84111 
LaVar E. Stark 
Attorney for Stewart Title 
2651 Washington Blvd. #10 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Steven M. Ashby 
Holbrook Company, Inc. 
151 North 600 West 
P.O. Box 226 
Kaysville, Utah 84037 
Thomas A. Duffin 
Attorney for Otto Buehner 
311 South State 
Suite 380 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Michael Glassman 
Attorney for Redd Roofing 
First Security Bank Bldg. #1000 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
David B. Smith 
First Interstate Bank of Arizona 
P.O. Box 20551 
Phoenix, Arizona 85036 
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Robert F. Babcock of 
WALSTAD KASIMER TANSEY & ITTIG 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
185 South State, Suite 1000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 531-7000 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WEBER, STATE OF UTAH 
WORTHINGTON & KIMBALL CONSTRUCTION : 
COMPANY, a Utah General Partnership, et al, : MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION 
: TO MOTION TO VACATE 
Plaintiffs, : 
vs. : Ip/j/ 
C & A DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, et al, : Civil No. 83387 
Defendants. : 
Plaintiff, by and through its attorney, Robert F. Babcock of and for Waist ad 
Kasimer Tansey & Ittig, hereby submit this Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants1 
Motion to Vacate Award. 
FACTS 
The claims of the parties to this proceeding arise out of the construction 
of the project known as the Permaloy Building in the Weber Industrial Park near Ogden, 
Utah. Plaintiff, the general contractor, claimed the unpaid contract balance toerether 
with interest thereon plus other consequential damages. Defendants C & A Development 
Company, C & A Enterprises, and C & A Companies, the owner-developer, alleged that 
the cost to complete and repair the subject building exceeded the contract balance due 
Plaintiff by approximately $1,000,000.00. 
The contract between the parties, attached as Exhibit tTBtT to the Motion to 
Confirm Award, provides in Article 16 that all disputes concerning the contract be 
submitted to the American Arbitration Association for final and binding arbitration. 
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Pursuant to said contractural provision, the parties submitted to said American 
Arbitration Association the subject claims. 
The panel of arbitrators consisted of Peter W. Billings, Esq., the senior 
partner of Fabian & Clendenin, George E. Lyman, Esq. and B. Lue Bettilyon, owner of 
Bettilyon Construction Company. Seventeen days of hearings were held on April 25 to 
29, May If? to 20, June 20 to 24 and July 14 and 15, 1983. During said hearings a total 
of 23 witnesses were called by the respective parties. The transcript of the hearings, 
including the depositions, exceeded 3,000 pages in length. Plaintiffs introduced 84 
exhibits (many were multi-page exhibits) and Defendants introduced 59 exhibits (again 
many were multi-page exhibits). During the hearings, the parties were given full 
opportunity to call all witnesses they desired. Both parties were given the opportunity 
to file and did in fact file both post-hearing and reply briefs exceeding 180 pages in 
length. The hearings covered nearly 100 disputed issues. 
The panel of arbitrators rendered an award on November 7, 1983, a copy 
of which is attached as Exhibit "A" to the Motion to Confirm Award. Plaintiffs brought 
their Motion to Confirm Award on November 18, 1983. Defendants responded by filing 
their Motion to Vacate Award. Both motions are before the court for disposition. 
ARGUMENT 
The parties to this dispute agreed by contract to resolve their disputes by 
arbitration. In recent years arbitration has become more and more the accepted mode 
of settling disputes in the construction industry. All major segments of the building 
community provide for arbitration in their standard form contracts. The chief justice 
of the United States Supreme Court is a staunch advocate of the use of alternate 
dispute resolution procedures and arbitration in particular. The Utah Supreme Court 
recently stated in a case upholding the constitutionality of arbitration that "the trend 
toward such inter se agreements without resort to litigation reflects a good, practical 
119 
way to resolve disputes." Lindon City vs. Engineers Construction Company, 636 P.2d 
1070, 1073 (Utah 1981). 
An earlier Utah court indicated that arbitration is favored in the law as a 
speedy and inexpensive method of adjudicating differences by a tribunal whose award 
is final and persons are being encouraged to resort to such procedures. Giannopulos 
vs. Pappas, 15 P.2d 335 (Utah 1932). 
Defendants C & A Development Company and C <5c A Enterprises challenge 
the award on four grounds. Each of the grounds will be discussed in the order argued 
by said Defendants. 
Before discussing the merits of said DefendantsT arguments it is important 
to reaffirm the standard of review to be given by this Court to the subject arbitration 
award. The discussion in the case of Park Imperial, Inc. vs. E. L. Farmer Construction 
Co., 454 P.2d 181 (Ariz. 1969) properly sets forth the standard of review. 
Were the trial court required to try each case de novo 
the reason for arbitration agreements woulde frustrated. 
(Citation omitted) 
In the instant case the person objecting to the award 
had the burden of making an "adequate showing" to the 
trial court wherein the award should be set aside. This 
Court on appeal is bound to view the action of the trial 
court in a light most favorable to upholding the trial 
courtTs determination, (citations omitted) just as the trial 
court was required to view the arbitration award in a 
light most favorable to upholding the said award. 
A party seeking to set aside an arbitration award on 
account of error has the burden to affirmatively establish 
the existence of such error and the fact that it was 
prejudicial. (Citation omitted) 
Further, the case of Mars Constructors, Inc. vs. Tropical Enterprises, Ltd., 
460 P.2d 317 (Hawaii 1969) sheds further light on the standard of review. The Hawaii 
Supreme Court, in discussing a motion to vacate an arbitration award, based on a 
statute having the same four grounds for vacating an arbitration award as the Utah 
statute, stated: 
This Court has decided to confine judicial review to the 
strictest possible limits, (Citations omitted) We reaffirm 
this holding because we believe an extensive judicial 
review of arbitration awards would frustrate the intent 
of the parties to avoid litigation and would also nullify 
the legislative objective in the enactment of the 
Arbitration and Awards statute. 
The parties have voluntarily agreed to arbitrate, and they 
thereby assumed all the hazards of the arbitration 
process, including the risk that the arbitrators may make 
mistakes in the application of law and in their findings 
of fact. In (earlier cases) this Court held that such 
mistakes of arbitrators did not vitiate awards and that 
the review of awards by the courts were limited to the 
provisions of the arbitration statute. 
I. THE PANEL OF ARBITRATORS DID NOT EXCEED THEIR POWERS IN RENDERING 
THE AWARD. 
A. THE AWARD WAS RENDERED TIMELY 
The parties agreed in the subject contract to abide by the rules of the 
American Arbitration Association. A copy of the pertinent rules are attached as Exhibit 
TfATT to Defendants1 Motion. Rule 41 provides: 
The award shall be made promptly by the arbitrator and, 
unless otherwise agreed by the parties or specified by 
law, not later than thirty days from the date of closing 
of the hearings. . . . 
Rule 36 provides as follows: 
The hearing may be reopened by the arbitrator at will, 
or upon application of a party at any time before the 
award is made. If the reopening of the hearing would 
prevent the making of the award within the specific time 
agreed upon by the parties in the contract out of which 
the controversy has arisen, the matter may not be 
reopened unless the parties agree upon the extension of 
such time limit. When no specific date is fixed in the 
contract, the arbitrator may reopen the hearings, and 
the arbitrator shall have thirty days from the closing of 
the reopened hearings within which to make an award. 
The hearings were initially closed on September 2, 1983 but were reopened 
on September 29, 1983. The reopened hearing was held on October 24, 1983 by means of 
a telephone conference in which the parties simply stipulated that in March, 1981, the 
contract between Plaintiff and C <5r A Development Company was assigned by C & A 
Development Company to C & A Enterprises. There was no evidence or other argument 
presented. The parties, however, further stipulated that said Defendants would have 
until and including October 28, 1983 to brief the effects of said assignment and that 
1 O * 
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Plaintiffs would have until November 4, 1983 to respond to the brief of said Defendants. 
Upon receipt of said briefs the arbitrators were to close the hearing. Rule 35 states, 
in part, as follows: 
If briefs are to be filed, the hearing shall be declared 
closed as of the final date set by the arbitrator for the 
receipt of briefs. . . . The time limit within which the 
arbitrator is required to make an award shall commence 
to run, in the absence of other agreements by the parties, 
upon the closing of the hearings. 
Therefore, pursuant to Rule 41, the award was to be made by December 4, 
1983. The award was in fact made well before that time in that the award was 
rendered November 7, 1983 and transmitted by letter dated November 11, 1983 from 
the American Arbitration Association to the respective parties. 
Defendants argue that the award must have been made on or before October 
2 which is within thirty days of the closing of the initial hearings. It should be 
emphasized that there is no specific time fixed in the contract within which an award 
must be made. The contract simply provides for adhering to the rules of the American 
Arbitration Association. 
Defendants either overlook or ignore the affect of Rule 36, quoted in its 
entirety above, which states in pertinent part: 
When no specific date is fixed in the contract, the 
arbitrator may reopen the hearings, and the arbitrator 
shall have thirty days from the closing of the reopened 
hearings within which to make an award. 
Assuming, for the sake of argument, that there was a problem with the 
timeliness of award, said Defendants clearly waived any right to object to the timeliness 
of award. A case which is dispositive of this issue is Ash Apartments vs. Martinez, 
656 P.2d 708 (Colo. 1982). The parties in that case, like the parties in the instant 
case, agreed to arbitrate their disputes pursuant to the Construction Industry Arbitration 
Rules of the American Arbitration Association. There was a disputed issue as to 
199 
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whether the parties had consented to an extension of the thirty day period in which 
the arbitrators had to enter an award. The court stated: 
The question of whether Plaintiffs consented to an 
extention is irrelevent to the disposition of this issue 
because it is uncontroverted that Plaintiffs chose not to 
object to the timeliness of the award until after it was 
announced with a result which was unfavorable to them. 
. . Since Plaintiffs here also chose to wait until it saw 
the results of the award, it waived its right to assert 
the untimeliness of the award as a defect. Consequently, 
the arbitrators1 award will not be vacated on this basis. 
Such are the facts in the incident case. Said Defendants in their Response 
to Motion for Reopening of Hearing dated September 13, 1983 made no mention of the 
timeliness of the award. Neither did said Defendants object in their Response of 
Respondents dated October 28, 1983 nor in their Respondent's Memorandum Regarding 
Award of Costs and Fees dated November 3, 1983. If said Defendants truly believed 
that the time to render an award lapsed on October 2, 1983 then said Defendants 
clearly waived any objection by failing to raise the objection during the telephone 
conference of October 24, 1983 and the briefs of October 28 and November 3 of 1983. 
Said Defendants chose not to object to the timeliness of the arbitration award until 
after the unfavorable result was announced. 
Aerain, the rules clearly provide that the arbitrator mav reopen the hearing 
and that the time for rendering an award runs thirty days from the closing of the 
reopened hearings. Therefore, the award was rendered well within the time requirements 
set forth in the rules. 
B. THE PANEL OF ARBITRATORS DID NOT LIMIT THE EVIDENCE 
Said Defendants assert in their Motion to Vacate that the arbitrators directed 
that the rebuttal case be limited to two days. Such is not the case. The true facts 
are that the parties, during the week of June 20 to 24 agreed that the next hearing 
dates would be July 14 and 15 and that it was assumed that the parties would complete 
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the presentation of evidence during those two days. Attached hereto as Exhibit "A" 
is page 1982 of the transcript in which the chairman of the panel, Mr. Billings, states: 
Wefve agreed that assuming we finish with all the 
testimony at the end of the day on the 15th of July, 
the counsel will file their briefs simultaneously. . . is 
that agreeable for each side? 
Counsel for said Defendants agreed to such statement. 
More importantly, said Defendants did not use the full two days to present 
its surrebuttal case but terminated its surrebuttal case at approximately twelve noon 
on July 15th. Again, Mr. Billings, the chairman of the panel asked counsel for said 
Defendants if they had any further witnesses to which counsel for said Defendants 
indicated that they had no more witnesses. See copies of pages 2694-96 of the transcript 
attached hereto as Exhibit TTB". Said exhibit shows no objection to concluding the 
evidence portion taking of the hearing. Further, no objection was ever made on or off 
the record. 
C. THE PANEL OF ARBITRATORS DID NOT EXCEED ITS AUTHORITY IN 
AWARDING INTEREST AT 15 PERCENT PER ANNUM. 
The contract between the parties in Article 11.1.4 provides that payments 
due but unpaid shall bear interest at the rate the owner is paying on the construction 
loan or at the legal rate, whichever is higher. In support of its position, Plaintiff 
submitted Exhibit 28, one page of which is attached hereto as Exhibit "C". Said exhibit 
reflects the interest rate requested by Plaintiff which was the rate of the construction 
loan (a floating rate of prime plus two percent). The arbitrators did not start the 
running of interest in August 1981 as Plaintiff requested but delayed it until December, 
1981. Rather than awarding interest at the floating rate the arbitrators awarded 
interest at the average of the various interest rates from December 1981 to the present 
which averages 15.05 percent (rounded it off to fifteen percent). 
Plaintiffs submit that it is clearly within the perrogative and power of the 
arbitrators to use an average interest rate rather than using the floating interest rate. 
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An early Utah case contains language which sheds light on this issue. The court in 
Bivans vs. Utah Lake Land, Water & Power Company, 174 P. 1126 (Utah 1918) states: 
Speaking generally, it may be said that (arbitration) 
awards will not be disturbed on account of irregularities 
or informalities, or because the court does not agree 
with the award, so long as the proceeding has been fair 
and honest and the substantial rights of the parties have 
been respected. 
The case of Giannopulos vs. Pappas, supra, also states that "ordinarily a 
court has no authority to review the action of arbitrators to correct errors or to 
substitute its conclusions for that of the arbitrators acting honestly and within the 
scope of their authority". 
D. THE PANEL OF ARBITRATORS PROPERLY ENTERED THE AWARD AGAINST 
BOTH C & A ENTERPRISES AND C k A DEVELOPMENT COMPANY. 
The construction contract was initially entered into between Plaintiff and 
Defendant C & A Development Company. It was stipulated between the parties that 
said contract was subsequently assigned by Defendant C & A Development Company 
to Defendant C & A Enterprises. Said assignment makes both parties liable. Plaintiff 
never specifically withdrew their claim against Defendant C & A Development but 
acknowledges that its statement in the reply of Plaintiff of November 4, 1983 is 
ambiguous in terms of Plaintiffs not arguing further what had already been argued to 
the panel. 
Further, and more importantly, the principle heretofore cited that ordinarily 
a court has no authority to review the action of arbitrators to correct errors or to 
substitute its conclusion for that of the arbitrators acting honestly and within the scope 
of their authority is applicable here as well. 
II. THE PANEL OF ARBITRATORS WAS NOT GUILTY OF MISCONDUCT IN REFUSING 
TO PERMIT SAID DEFENDANTS TO SUPPLEMENT THEIR SURREBUTTAL CASE. 
As has been outlined heretofore, the purpose of the reopened hearing was 
to clarify the assignment of the construction contract between Defendant C Sc A 
1 
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Development and Defendant C & A Enterprises to clarify the proper parties to the 
action. Initially, said Defendants objected to the reopening unless said Defendants 
could present further evidence on all issues of the case. The panel of arbitrators 
decided to reopen the hearing to clarify the proper parties. The necessity of the 
clarification arose out of the fact that throughout the seventeen day hearing the 
witnesses, the arbitrators, counsel for Plaintiff, and even counsel for Defendants simply 
referred to the three C & A entities as TtC & A" without effort to differentiate or 
distinguish among the different entities. 
More importantly, said Defendants never made any proffer of evidence as 
to what evidence said Defendants wanted to present but simply stated that they wanted 
to present additional surrebuttal evidence. Section 78-31-16(3) provides that arbitrators 
may be guilty of misconduct only in refusing "to hear evidence pertinent and material 
to the controversy, or of any other misbehavior by which the rights of any party have 
been prejudiced." There is absolutely no showing or even an inkling of what it was 
that said Defendants wanted to present that they had not presented or had an opportunity 
to present during the 17 days of hearing extending over a four month period. Neither 
is there the slightest evidence that the excluded evidence was "pertinent and material 
to the controversy". 
in. THERE WAS NOT EVIDENT PARTIALITY ON THE PART OF THE PANEL OF 
ARBITRATORS. 
Said Defendants are clearly grasping at straws to argue that this panel was 
guilty of "evident partiality". To support its argument said Defendants simply point 
out issues in which the panel ruled against said Defendants. If there had been evident 
partiality why didn't the panel of arbitrators award Plaintiff a sum in excess of 
$750,000.00 as was requested. See the summary of damages entered at the hearing 
attached hereto as Exhibit "D". 
1 
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Said Defendants dispute the panel's interpretation of some contract language. 
Said Defendants cite one page of testimony from one witness where in reality ten 
witnesses testified regarding that issue and the testimony consisted of hundreds of 
pages. Further, said Defendants assert that there was clear evidence that differential 
settlement had occurred and caused damage to the building. There was also clear 
evidence presented that what had occurred was not damage to the building but was 
nothing out of the ordinary. 
Let it simply be said that the arbitrators heard the evidence which was 
voluminous and either found that there was no damage or found that Plaintiff was not 
liable for the damage. In either event, the arbitrators are not guilty of "evident 
partiality" simply because they found against said Defendants. 
IV. THE AWARD WAS NOT PROCURED BY FRAUD OR OTHER UNDUE MEANS. 
Said Defendants have gone from grasping at straws to trying to catch the 
wind in arguing that the award was procured by fraud or other undue means. There was 
a dispute throughout the hearing concerning the scope of work for the subject 
construction contract. Several sets of contract drawings were introduced into evidence 
and testimony presented regarding variations between the different sets of contract 
drawings and the importance of said variations. Nine witnesses testified regarding this 
issue. The issue was briefed by both parties. The arbitrators apparently found that 
the scope of work was as asserted by Plaintiff which included approximately 80 signed 
change orders to the contract. Said Defendants argued during the course of the hearing, 
in their briefs, and now in their Motion to Vacate Award that Plaintiff committed 
fraud upon said Defendants in somehow duping said Defendants in what work was 
actually to be performed. The scope of work issue has been fully litigated. The ruling 
must stand. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, Plaintiff submits that the award of the panel of 
arbitrators be confirmed. The dispute is over two years old, has been through protracted 
evidentiary hearings where all parties were provided the opportunity to present all 
evidence desired, and a decision has been rendered by an impartial qualified panel of 
arbitrators. The parties should be required to abide by the decision of the panel of 
arbitrators. 
Respectfully submitted this of December, 1983. 
WALSTAD KASIMER TANSEY & ITTIG 
By: $JLi ¥-&dkrjL 
Robert F. Babcock 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Memorandum 
in Opposition to Motion to Vacate, postage thereon fully prepaid, this D day of 
January, 1984, to the following: 
Robert F. Bentley 
Vaughn Armstrong 
C & A Companies, Inc. 
P. O. Box 1549 
Scottsdale, AZ 84252 
LaVar E. Stark 
Attorney for Stewart Title 
2651 Washington Blvd. #10 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Steven M. Ashby 
Holbrook Company, Inc. 
151 North fiOO West 
P. O. Box 226 
Kaysville, Utah 84037 
Joseph Smith Plumbing 
483 E. Maryrose Drive 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
Thomas A. Duffin 
Attorney for Otto Buehner 
311 South State 
Suite 380 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Michael Glassman 
Attorney for Redd Roofing 
First Security Bank Bldg. #1000 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Jeff Willis 
Streich, Lang, Weeks & Cardon 
P. O. Box 471 
Phoenix, A7 85001 
V<^^~\ , ?f diu^ 
Worthington & Kimball. 
(Hearing adjourned.) 
* * * 
(24 J*t£y 1983 - 2:00 p.m.) ' 
MR. BILLINGS: We've agreed that assuming we 
finish 'with all the testimony at the end of the day en the 15th 
| of July, that counsel will file their briefs simultaneously en ; 
i 
the 15th of August, and they'll serve each other by express j 
mail. And at the same time, they'll send copies to each of the; 
Panel, and that reply briefs will be due on the 25th of August i 
to be served in the same fashion. Is that agreeable for each 
side? 
MR. ARMSTRONG: Yes. 
MR. TANSEY: On the 15th and on the 25th. We ; 
i 
will also provide a copy to the AAA. i 
MR. BILLINGS: If they want, but we want curs \ 
direct. \ 
MR. TANSEY: Yes. 
I 
MR. ARMSTRONG: Shall we send them all to you? j 
MR. LYMAN: You have the addresses. j 
i 
MR. BILLINGS: You have our addresses. Why 
don't ycu send them separately? I 
i 
MR. BILLINGS: Mr. Rollins, you're still under i 
oath. 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
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| ; 
; TK2 WITNESS: That's right.
 ; 
J MR. BETTILYON: Okay. 
i ! 
; MR. BABCOCK: But for further clarification, the; 
i • • 
i sample was taken off the east wall which would have the 900 > 
! .! 
i loading, not the 2,500. 
! THE WITNESS: No, no. The sample was taken on 
; the south wall. 
| MR. BILLINGS: Letfs not all talk at once. 
\ Either have counsel or the — j 
| THE V7ITNESS: The test pits were taken, ! 
j according to the testimony, on the east side. The boring, the 
I ! 
'last boring made was taken on the south side or the heavy ! 
| loaded one. j 
MR. BABCOCK: I'll clarify that. There were two! 
j ! 
j test pits on the east wall. Rollins1 boring was on the east j 
j wall. Rollins took another sample for Chen's third test, which'; 
j was taken en the south wall. 
I 
BILLINGS: Anything further with this j 
i 
BABCOCK: No. j 
ARMSTRONG: No. I 
BILLINGS: Thank you, Mr. Anderson. j 
BILLINGS: Do you have any further I 
ARMSTRONG: No. I 
2694 ! 
I witness? 
witnesses? 
MR. 
MR. 
MR. 
MR. 
MR. 
MR. 
131 
MR. BILLINGS: Do you have anything further 
witnesses, Mr. Babcock? 
MR. BABCOCK: No. 
MR. BILLINGS: Then the evidence portion taking 
of this hearing will be concluded. It's my understanding that 
counsel agreed they will exchange briefs and furnish therr. to 
the arbitrators en the 15th of August and reply briefs ten cays 
thereafter, which would be the 25th. 
MR. TANSEY: I think we agreed we would szr.d 
each one individually and also send a copy to AAA. 
MR. BILLINGS: If both side agree to do that — 
MR. TANSEY: We agreed on the 15th, Federal 
Express or whatever, same day. 
MR. LYMAN: The hearing doesn't technically 
close until the last brief is received. 
MR. TANSEY: Yes. Until the close it. 
MR. BILLINGS: We close it. And I was just 
going to suggest that we would close it by — we will have a 
session, the three of us, after we've had a chance to review 
the briefs, both the open and responsive briefs. 
(Off-the-record.) 
MR. BILLINGS: For the record, the Board of 
Arbitrators will meet on August 30, 9:30 a.m. here, and
 N 
officially close the hearing at that time, unless after 
discussion of the briefs, we feel we need seme more help from 
2695 
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| counsel/ if that's agreeable. 
i 
i MR. EABCOCK: That's fine. 
I 
I 
| MR. ARMSTRONG: That's fine. 
i (Hearing concluded.) 
* * * 
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LAST DRAW INCLUDING RETAINAGE 445,383.00 
INTEREST ON EXCESSIVE RETAINAGE WITHHELD 15,373.00 
INTEREST ON LATE PAYMENTS 9.7 34.00 
DATE, 
8-30-31 
9-30-31 
10-30-81 
11-30-81 
12-30-81 
1-30-82 
2-29-82 
3-30-82 
4-30-82 
5-30-82 
6-30-82 
7-30-82 
8-30-82 
9-30-82 
10-30-82 
11-30-32 
12-3 0-3 2 
1-30-83 
2-30-83 
3-30-83 
4-30-83 
5-30-83 
TOTAL 470,990.0 0 
ACCRUING INTEREST 
INTEREST INTEREST 
RATE DUE 
(22.50) + 17 4LS8 
(22.08) + 8693.26 
(20.45) + 8204.37 
(13.84) + 7687.26 
(17.7 5) + 7356.21 
07.75) + 7465.02 
(18.5 6) + 7921.14 
(18.50) + 8017.65 
(18.50) + 814L26 
(18.50) + 8266.77 
(18.50) + 8394.21 
(18.26) + 8413.05 
(16.39) + 7665.38 
(15.50) + 7349.11 
(14.52) + 6973.38 
(13.85) + 6732.09 
(13.50) + 6637.70 
(13J6) + 6543.32 
(12.98) + 6524.60 
(12.98) + 6595.13 
(12.98) + 6666.52 
02.98) + 6738.62 
BALANCE 
DUE 
472,7 31.93 
431,430.24 
43 9,634.61 
497,321.37 
504,678.08 
512,143.10 
520,064.2 4 
528,031.89 
536,223.15 
544,439.92 
552,334.13 
551,297.13 
558^63.58 
576,312.67 
583,286.05 
590,018.14 
595,655.84 
603,199.16 
609,723.76 
616,318.93 
622,935.44 
629,7 24.06 
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SUMMARY 0 ? DAMAGES 
Baiance of Contract and Retalnage 445.3S3.OD 
Interest on Excessive Retalnage Withheld 3y C k A 15,373.00 
Interest On Late Progress Payments 8.7 34.00 
Interest On Contract Payments To Date 133.734.CO 
Delay Damages — Extended Overhead 130.035.CO 
Interference ~ Disruption Damages 50.CC0.00 
Additional Tank Line Wall 2.5 00.00 
Great Due C & A C3.C47.C0) 
TOTAL DUE 735 532.0 0 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY, -STATE OF U£AH 
WORTHINGTON & KIMBALL CONSTRUCTION 
COMPANY, a Utah General Partnership, 
GARY WORTHINGTON and EDWIN N. 
KIMBALL, General Partners, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
C & A DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, an 
Arizona corporation, C & A 
ENTERPRISES, an Arizona partnership, 
FIRST INTERSTATE BANK OF ARIZONA, 
STEWART TITLE COMPANY, et al., 
Defendants. 
Having studied the parties1 memoranda and heard oral 
argument thereon, I find that the arbitrators did not exceed 
their powers, no evidence of misconduct or partiality, no 
evidence that award was procured by fraud or other means. 
Plaintiff's motion to confirm award is granted. Defendants C & A 
Development Company and C & A Enterprises motion to vacate the 
award is denied. 
DATED this ' &L day of January, 1984. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Civil No. 83387 
Page 2 
Memorandum Decision 
Case No. 83387 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 13- day of January, 1984, 
a true and correct copy of the foregoing Memorandum Decision was 
served upon the following: 
Robert F. Babcock 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
185 South State, Suite 1000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Robert F. Bentley 
Attorney for Defendant 
C & A Companies, Inc. 
P. 0. Box 1549 
Scottsdale, Arizona 84252 
LaVar E. Stark 
Attorney for Stewart Title 
2651 Washington Blvd. #10 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Joseph Smith Plumbing 
483 E. Maryrose Drive 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84037 
Thomas A. Duffin 
Attorney for Buehner 
311 South State #380 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Michael J. Glasmann 
Attorney for Redd Roffing 
1000 First Security Bank 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
David B. Smith 
First Interstate Bank of 
Arizona 
P. 0. Box 20551 
Phoenix, Arizona 85036 
Steven M. Ashby 
Holbrook Company, Inc. 
151 North 600 West 
Kaysville, Utah 84037 
PAULA CARR, Secretary 
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THOMAS A. DUFFIN of 
SPAFFORD, DIBB, DUFFIN & JENSEN 
Attorneys for Defendant, 
Otto Buehner & Company 
311 South State, Suite 380 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 531-8020 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT, IN AND FOR 
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
WORTHINGTON & KIMBALL 
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, a 
Utah general partnership 
GARY WORTHINGTON and 
EDWIN N. KIMBALL, general 
partners, 
Plaintiff, 
vs 
C & A DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, 
an Arizona corporation, 
C & A ENTERPRISES, an Arizona 
partnership, FIRST INTERSTATE 
BANK OF ARIZONA, N.A., 
STEWART TITLE COMPANY OF 
SALT LAKE CITY, C & A 
DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, INC., an 
Arizona corporation, 
PERMALOY CORPORATION, a Utah 
corporation, OTTO BUEHNER & 
COMPANY, HOLBROOK COMPANY, 
INC., DONALD K. LYBBERT, dba 
LYBBERT MASONRY COMPANY, 
JOSEPH SMITH PLUMBING, 
REDD ROOFING COMPANY and 
JOHN DOES 1 through 24, 
S U M M O N S 
C i v i l No. 83387 
Defendants. 
-2-
THE STATE OF UTAH TO THE ABOVE NAMED DEFENDANTS: 
You are hereby summoned and required to file an answer 
in writing to the attached Crossclaim with the clerk of the above 
entitled court, and to serve upon, or mail to THOMAS A. DUFFIN, 
Cross-Claim Defendant, Otto Buehner & Company's attorney, 311 
South State, Suite 380, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, a copy of 
said answer within 20 days after service of this Summons upon 
you. 
If you fail so to do, judgment by default will be taken 
against you for the relief demanded in said Crossclaim which has 
been filed with the clerk of said court and a copy of which is 
hereto annexed and herewith served upon you. 
Dated this '?^ day of ^  V -TV 1983. 
SPAFFORD, DIBB, DUFFIN & JENSEN 
/ £ 7^ Z /? Js <- // 
Thomas A. Duffin 
Attorney for Otto Buehner & Co, 
Serve: 
Redd Roofing Company 
513 West Lake Street 
Ogden, Utah 
Recorded BOOK .,.•• 
Page ^J.\ 
Indexed . * * ^ j j j 
Robert F. ^abcock of '-— " T 7 
WALSTAD KASIMER TANSEY & ITTIG 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
185 South State, Suite 1000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 531-7000 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WEBER, STATE OF UTAH 
WORTHIMGTON & KIMBALL CONSTRUCTION 
COMPANY, a Utah General Partnership, 
et al, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
C & A DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, et al, 
Defendants. 
ORDER AND JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 83387 
Plaintiff's Motion to Confirm Award and Defendant's Motion to Vacate Award 
came on regularly for hearing on January 6, 1984 at 11:00 a.m. before the Honorable 
Ronald O. Hyde. Robert F. Babcock was present and representing Plaintiffs. Robert 
F. Bentley and Vaughn Armstrong were present and representing Defendants C & A 
Development Company and C & A Enterprises. LaVar E. Stark was present and 
representing Defendant Stewart Title. Thomas A. Duffin was present and representing 
Buehner Concrete. Michael J. Glassman was present and representing Redd Roofing. 
The Court having considered the respective motions and having been fully 
advised as to the Pleadings, the parties' memoranda and having heard oral argument 
thereon, 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED, 
that Plaintiff's Motion to Confirm Award is granted and Defendants C & A Development 
Company and C <5c A Enterprises' Motion to Vacate Award is denied. 
Indexed 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff recover judgment against C & A 
Development Company, an Arizona Corporation, and C <Sc A Enterprises, an Arizona 
general partnership, with C & A Companies, Inc., an Arizona Corporation, Frank S. 
Campbell, Robert A. Campbell, F. Richard Campbell, Gary Dee Jones, and Robert F. 
Bentley, as general partners, the sum of $377,131,00 plus interest at the rate of fifteen 
percent (15%) per annum from December 1, 1981 until paid together with costs as 
awarded. 
DATED this £ 3 day of January, 1984. 
BY THE-T^URT: 
RonalckO; Hyde, District Jud| 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Order and 
Judgment, postage thereon fully prepaid, this \ ( day of January, 1984, to the 
following: 
Robert F. Bentley 
Vaughn Armstrong 
C & A Companies, Inc. 
P. O. Box 1549 
Scottsdale, AZ 84252 
LaVar E. Stark 
Attorney for Stewart Title 
2651 Washington Blvd. #10 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Steven M. Ashby 
Holbrook Company, Inc. 
151 North 600 West 
P. O. Box 226 
Kaysville, Utah 84037 
Joseph Smith Plumbing 
483 E. Maryrose Drive 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
Thomas A. Duffin 
Attorney for Otto Buehner 
311 South State 
Suite 380 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Michael Glassman 
Attorney for Redd Roofing 
First Security Bank Bldg. #1000 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Jeff Willis 
Streich, Lang, Weeks & Cardon 
P. O. Box 471 
Phoenix, AZ 85001 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
:(\ 
WORTHINGTON & KIMBALL, et al., 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
C & A DEVELOPMENT 
COMPANY, et al.f 
Defendants. 
I hold that while Otto Buehner & Company were not 
personally part of and involved in the arbitration dispute 
between Kimball Construction and C & A Enterprises, their claim 
was. That the arbitration decision is dispositive of the claims 
between Kimball and C & A. That the doctrine of collateral 
estoppel is applicable to the claim of Otto Beuhner and is 
binding upon C & A Companies as to the amount due and owing. 
The arbitration dispute also settled the responsibility 
for any failures or defects in the building resulting from soil 
conditions, defferential settlement and the like. The sufficiency 
of the footings was determined by the arbitration board not to be 
the responsibility of the contractor; therefore, through the 
application of collateral estoppel also found not to be the 
responsibility of Otto Beuhner. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Case No. 83387 
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In other wordsf the counterclaim of C & A Enterprises 
against Otto Beuhner is barred on the basis of the collateral 
estoppel doctrine. 
As to whether or not Otto Buehner substantially complied 
with the notice provisions of mechanic's liens, the decision 
thereon is reserved for trial with the other questions of the 
validity of liens. 
DATED this day of November, 1984, 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this day of November, 19 84, 
a true and correct copy of the foregoing Memorandum Decision was 
served upon the following: 
Robert F. Bentley 
Attorney for C & A Enterprises, Inc. 
7525 East Camelback Road 
Scottsdale, Arizona 85251 
LaVar E. Stark 
Attorney for Security Title and 
First Interstate Bank 
2485 Grant Avenue 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
j ^ i — — ^ _ 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
WORTHINGTON & KIMBALLf et al., 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
C & A DEVELOPMENT 
COMPANY, et al., 
Defendants. 
As to the question of the date of final completion of 
the prime contract. I find that the date of the delivery of the 
certificate of substantial completion is not the key date. I 
find that the evidence shows that the plaintiffs were doing 
continual work in the nature of punch list corrections up to the 
date they were requested to leave. I find that the date of 
November 12, when they went in and dug the final trench, was the 
date of final completion. I further find that this work was done 
in good faith and not for the purpose of extending the lien date. 
The application of final payment was not made until after this 
date which is further evidence of good faith in trying to 
complete the punch list work. I further find that the continual 
work on the punch list was not trivial or minor, but was a good 
faith attempt to remedy defects as requested by the owner. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
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As to the Otto Beuhner lien. This lien was filed within 
64 days following the suspension of the work on the project, and, 
therefore, timely filed. A copy of the lien was mailed to the 
owner on January 18. It was not mailed by certified mail; 
however, it is agreed that the owners received a copy of the 
mechanic's lien a few days following January 18. Section 38-1-7 
requires that the lien claimant shall deliver or mail by 
certified mail a copy of the lien. I hold that the purpose of 
this phrasing is to assure notice, and that where notice was 
admittedly received, that the failing to mail by certified mail 
is of no legal significance. Regular mail would satisfy the 
deliver requirement. 
The question of proper verification is not raised on the 
Beuhner lien. In regard to the Beuhner lien, I hold that it is 
valid and enforceable. If my figures are correct, the amount 
owed is $41,466 with interest since December 1, 1981. In this 
regard, I hold the interest to be the legal rate and not the 15% 
awarded by the arbitration board. The 15% figure was apparently 
used as a form of penalty. In regard to attorney's fees for the 
enforcement of this lien, I find the amount of $12,000 to be 
reasonable. 
As to Smith Plumbing, they filed a counterclaim against 
Worthington & Kimball, but did not bring an action for the fore-
closure of its lien. I find that the amount owed Smith Plumbing 
is $6,172.50 with interest at 10% from December 1, 1981. 
722 
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I find the amount owed Worthington & Kimball is $377,131 
less $2,355 that goes to personal property and not under the 
lien. 
As to the first and second mechanic's liens of 
Worthington & Kimball, it appears to me that the second 
mechanic's lien is nothing more than a correction of the descrip-
tion set forth in the first, and was probably superfluous in that 
the first mechanic's lien description, though flawed, was 
sufficient to give notice. The problem with the plaintiffs' lien 
or liens is that they are not verified. Each is an acknowledg-
ment that the signer executed the notice, and that the contents 
thereof is true of his own knowledge. This is not a verifica-
tion. A verbal affirmation that the statements are true is not 
the same as or a substitute for a verification. Verification 
requires both the swearing to the truth of the statements by the 
subscriber and certification thereto by the officer authorized by 
law to administer oaths. Section 38-1-7 states "the claim must 
be verified". It appears that the case of First Security 
Mortgage v. Hansen forecloses a substitution for actual 
verification. That case states "verification is not a 
hypertechnicality that we can discount. Without verification, no 
lien is created. Our statute leaves no room for doubt as to the 
requirement of a verified notice of claim, and this court, in 
Eccles Lumber Company v. Martin stated that since a mechanic's 
723 
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lien is statutory and not contractualf a lien cannot be acquired 
unless the claimant complies with the statutory provision," The 
Court further stated that "where the statute fails, courts cannot 
create rights, and should not do so by unnatural and forced 
construction.n 
Plaintiffs' notice of lien, lacking verification, fails 
to create a valid mechanic's lien. 
v^ tto Beuhner is entitled to judgment against Worthington 
& Kimball for the figure set out abovef as is Smith Plumbing. 
Otto Beuhner is entitled to a decree of foreclosure in the amount 
as set out above plus attorney's fees. In regard to attorney's 
fees to the prevailing party, in regard to the failure to 
Worthington & Kimball's lien, I find C & A's attorney's fees to 
be reasonably worth $6,000, and the Defendants First Interstate 
Bank of Arizona and Stewart Title together to be worth $6,000. 
The reason these fees are less than Beuhner's attorney's fees is 
because they prevail in part and do not prevail in part. 
Counsel for Otto Beuhner and Company is to prepare 
findings, conclusion and judgment in accordance herewith. 
DATED this /0 day of January, 1985. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this \[ day of January, 1985, 
a true and correct copy of the foregoing Memorandum Decision was 
served upon the following: 
Robert F. Bentley 
Attorney for C & A Enterprises, Inc. 
7525 East Camelback Road 
Scottsdale, Arizona 85251 
LaVar E. Stark 
Attorney for Security Title and 
First Interstate Bank 
2485 Grant Avenue 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Robert F. Babcock 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
185 South State, Suite 1000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Thomas A. Duffin 
Attorney for Defendant Otto Beuhner 
311 South State, Suite 380 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
PAULA CARR, Secretary 
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